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ABSTRACT
Yale mathematician, Benoît B. Mandelbrot, revolutionized the way in which we
view and understand the natural world. Where earlier visionaries were only
able to see mathematical “monsters,” Mandelbrot was able to discern nature’s
geometric masterpiece. This dramatic breakthrough allowed him to
identify and comprehend patterns and shapes that no one had previously
understood and led him to develop the field of fractal geometry. Similar
patterns, this article contends, are deeply embedded in the U.S. Constitution,
and the metaphor of fractals, therefore, enables us to significantly bolster our
understanding of the nation’s supreme law. This article, thus, develops the
fractal theory of American constitutionalism, which posits that profound
patterns of self-similarity ought to inform our fundamental understanding of
the Constitution’s inherent structure and elemental coherence. In doing so, this
novel theory not only illuminates the very nature of the U.S. Constitution and
its contents, but it elucidates how the Constitution operates and provides a
foundation for a key method of constitutional interpretation. Finally, the
fractal theory of American constitutionalism provides a new methodology for
gauging the document’s tensile strength and exposing historical fault lines and
present structural weaknesses. In doing so, this theory also provides general
guidance on how to mend possible constitutional deficiencies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Salvador Dali’s painting, The Visage of War, depicts a morbid
disembodied face against the backdrop of a desolate landscape. The face’s
frozen, furrowed brow, locked-open jaw, and emaciated appearance virtually
exude the stench of decomposition and instills in the observer the sense of pain
associated with conflict. Both of the face’s cavernous eye sockets and its open
mouth all contain reduced-sized versions of the whole image. And within the
eyes and mouths of those reduced-sized versions are further reduced-sized
versions of the whole. The clear intent is to suggest that these repetitions
continue ad infinitum. The surreal, dark work conveys Dali’s conception of the
infinite horrors of war.1 It is also the case that this artwork exhibits a fractallike structure.
Fractals are geometric shapes. When a fractal is split into parts, its
respective components possess a property called self-similarity. This means
that a fractal’s components are each reduced-sized copies of the whole shape.
Or, conversely, the whole shape is, in a sense, a copy of its pieces. This
repetition, or perhaps, redundancy, arguably reinforces the fractal shape, at
least insofar as repetition signifies patterns and relations, and generates clarity.
Indeed, fracticality provides insights into the nature of geometric shapes, with
respect to their complexity, dimensions, and scale. Fractal patterns abound in
nature, and although we have observed them for millennia, the late, revered
Yale mathematician, Benoît B. Mandelbrot, was the one to coin the term
“fractal” and develop the field of fractal geometry. Mandelbrot, who was a
modern-day Renaissance man, not only recognized fractals in nature, but
discovered fractal patterns in a multitude of fields, including finance, physics,
architecture, and fractography (the study of the mechanics of fractures in
materials).2 These patterns not only represented fractal geometry’s remarkably
wide set of applications, but illuminated key issues in each of these diverse
areas. So, too, will this article argue that fractals bolster our understanding of
the nation’s supreme law—the U.S. Constitution.
Chief Justice Marshall famously wrote in McCulloch v. Maryland, “we
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”3 Indeed, the U.S
Constitution is more than a mere checklist of clauses memorialized by an inkstained parchment. It is also more than a formula or mathematical concept.
And, the Constitution is not, literally speaking, a mathematical fractal. Yet, the
Constitution does have a certain, special order to it, something that makes it

1. Michael Frame & Benoît B. Mandelbrot, A Panorama of Fractals and Their Uses:
Dali’s Fractal, YALE UNIV., http://classes.yale.edu/fractals/panorama/welcome.html (last visited
Apr. 19, 2013).
2. BENOÎT B. MANDELBROT & RICHARD L. HUDSON, THE (MIS)BEHAVIOR OF MARKETS
xvi (2006).
3. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

392

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII:389

more than a mere statute. It is not simply the supreme law because it has been
labeled as such; the Constitution embodies a deep democratic logic. Yet, this
logic needs to be animated by a diligent, vigilant, and thoughtful populace in
order for it to have effect. For this to happen, there must be a robust
understanding of how the Constitution operates. Philip Bobbitt has helped
improve the clarity of constitutional thought and discourse by delineating
various methods of constitutional argument, particularly historical, textual,
doctrinal, structural, prudential, and ethical.4 This article suggests that the
metaphor of fractals can aid constitutional thought by deepening our
understanding of the Constitution’s inherent structure. Such an understanding,
it will be argued, will enable us to better comprehend the Constitution’s
coherence as well as the profound nature of the document itself and the grand
themes and principles that it embodies. This understanding, in turn, not only
illuminates the very concept of the Constitution and its contents, but it also
highlights the Constitution’s historical fault lines and present structural
weaknesses. In doing so, the fractal theory of American constitutionalism is
also prescriptive, because it provides some general guidance on how to
improve the Constitution, which although a work of genius, still is a work in
progress.
To be sure, this is a work on constitutional thought, rather than fractal
geometry, and, as such, the fractal metaphor should be used with a degree of
prudence and caution. The metaphor, however, does seem to have heuristic
value. Hopefully, just as the fractal pattern in Dali’s painting illustrates the
infinite horrors of war, so too, perhaps, can the recognition of a fractal-like
structure girding the U.S. Constitution illuminate the document’s eternally
profound themes and spirit.
II. FRACTALS
Although a complex mathematical understanding of fractals is not required
for the purposes of this article, a brief discussion of the basic concepts in
fractal geometry is in order, and a look at some examples of fractals should
prove useful to understanding how the fractal theory of American
constitutionalism operates.
The classical mathematics of the nineteenth century was rooted in the
regular geometric structures of Euclid and in Newtonian dynamics.5 These
approaches were useful and furthered understanding up to a point. The
problem, however, was that certain subsequently discovered mathematical
structures failed to conform to the patterns of Euclid and Newton.6
4. Philip Bobbitt, Methods of Constitutional Argument, 23 U. BRIT. COLUMBIA L. REV.
449, 449 (1989).
5. BENOÎT B. MANDELBROT, THE FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF NATURE 3 (1983).
6. Id.
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Mathematicians regarded these structures as “monsters.”7 Enter Mandelbrot.
The latter, an Eastern European refugee who spent years in obscurity after
coming to America, had an unusual gift for recognizing patterns. In his original
position as a researcher for I.B.M., he would notice patterns in data that
everyone else had overlooked.8 This talent eventually led him to pioneer fractal
geometry, which mirrored the real complexity of nature rather than just the
ideal forms of thought.9
Fractals produce a kind of paradox. Normally, if one divides a shape into
separate parts, or zooms in on a portion of that shape, one would expect to see
simpler shapes—the building blocks of the structure. The shape of a house, for
example, conforms to this intuition. Viewed from one hundred yards away, a
standard house will look like a roof atop a set of walls. From ten feet away,
one can see that this structure is comprised of simpler objects, small
rectangular tiles and bricks (or some other building materials). Fractals are
different.
Take Mandelbrot’s classic example of a cauliflower.10 It is a simple
enough vegetable, shaped like a tree, complete with what resembles a trunk,
branches, and canopy. Now, slice off one of its florets. What does one find? A
small piece of the vegetable, shaped like a whole cauliflower. Now, slice off a
sub-floret. What does one find? An even smaller piece of the vegetable, but
again shaped like a whole cauliflower. And, should one continue this process,
one would find increasingly small pieces of the vegetable, all shaped like a
whole cauliflower. Therefore, unlike the structure of a standard brick house,
which when viewed more closely is made up of bricks and mortar, a
cauliflower’s macroscopic structure is made up of smaller cauliflowers, in
theory, ad infinitum. It is in this sense that a cauliflower—or more broadly, a
fractal—is paradoxical. The whole shape, like that of a cauliflower, can be
quite simple. However, since that whole shape repeats itself as one zooms in
on it, that shape defies intuition by remaining equally complicated at every
level of magnification. It is in this sense that fractals are infinitely intricate and
produce an enigmatic mix of complexity and simplicity.11
Yet in the midst of this mystery, there is also clarity. As Mandelbrot
quipped, “there is hardly a paradox without utility.”12 Here, the repetitive

7. Id.
8. Jascha Hoffman, Benoît Mandelbrot, Novel Mathematician, Dies at 85, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 16, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/us/17mandelbrot.html?_r=0.
9. James Gleick, Fractal Vision, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2010/12/26/magazine/2010lives.html?_r=0#view=beno_t_mandelbrot.
10. Elaine Woo, Benoit Mandelbrot dies at 85; mathematician known as the father of
fractals, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/print/2010/oct/21/local/la-me-be
noit-mandelbrot-20101021.
11. MANDELBROT & HUDSON, supra note 2, at 145.
12. MANDELBROT, supra note 5, at 405.
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pattern in these so called “monsters” revealed a kind of structural order, and
have now been organized by fractals into a coherent field, enabling us to better
understand the world in which we live. Indeed, as it turns out, humans have
been producing fractal patterns for millennia, dating back 5,000 years to
kolams in southern India.13 And prior to that, humans had in a sense, been
breathing, thinking, and even being fractals, as these self-repeating patterns
have been observed in the bronchioles of our lungs,14 in brain waves,15 and
even in our DNA,16 respectively. It has been posited that these fractal patterns
may even help distinguish the beat of a healthy heart from a diseased one,17
and so perhaps here, too, such an analysis can help assess even the “health” of
a constitutional democracy. With these basic concepts in mind then, let us now
turn to how fractals can help us specifically understand the U.S. Constitution
and its content.
III. “POPULAR FRACTICALITY,” CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURAL COHERENCE,
AND INTERPRETATION
Fractals have at times been discovered in surprising places. Lucy PollardGott, for example, has identified striking instances of self-similarity in poetry
by finding subsets of a poem that bear structural resemblances to the whole.18
At an even deeper level, certain poems such as Alan Ginsberg’s Howl, repeat
not just word patterns, but ideas across several scales.19 And likewise,
structural fractals have been observed in literature, as in Paul Auster’s novel,
Mr. Vertigo, in which the first sentence “contains the essence of the whole
book.”20 Perhaps similarly, then, underlying the words and clauses of the
Constitution is a kind of a meta-structure—a deep, self-repeating pattern that
shapes the entire document, evidence of which appears in its Preamble, with its
timeless opening phrase, “We the People.”
The Preamble’s mere fifty-two words capture the entire Constitution’s very
essence: popular sovereignty. A phrase that is of both profound simplicity and
complexity, the Preamble embodies in plain English, the spirit of the

13. Frame & Mandelbrot, supra note 1, at Kolams, http://classes.yale.edu/fractals/panorama/
welcome.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
14. Stacey R. Boser et al., Fractal Geometry of Airway Remodeling in Human Asthma, 172
AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 817, 821 (2005).
15. Yoshiya Shinagawa et al., Fractal Dimensionality of Brain Wave, 6 FORMA 205, 205
(1991).
16. Yu Zu-Guo et al., Fractals in DNA sequence analysis, 11 CHINESE PHYSICS 1313, 1313
(2002).
17. Barry A. Cipra, A Healthy Heart is a Fractal Heart, 36 SIAM NEWS 1, 2 (2003).
18. Frame & Mandelbrot, supra note 1, at PollardGott: Other Directions.
19. Id. at Cantoring Poetry.
20. Id. at Structural Fractals in Literature.
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Constitution in both word and deed. Madison/Publius declared in The
Federalist No. 39,
the real character of the government . . . may be considered in relation to the
foundation on which it is to be established; to the sources from which its
ordinary powers are to be drawn . . . and to the authority by which future
21
changes in the government are to be introduced.

That character here seemed to be starkly defined by the people, as the
Preamble not only promised popular self-government, but both embodied and
enacted it.22 Not only would “the people” go on to be the most recurrent phrase
in the Bill of Rights,23 but it is a self-similar motif incorporated into and
throughout the 1789 document itself. The document was designed for the
people, and it was ratified by the people.24 Indeed, as Akhil Amar writes, the
Constitution was founded on popular sovereignty.25
The Preamble’s foundational principle of popular sovereignty reverberates
throughout (virtually) the entire Constitution. It pulsates through the
Constitution’s various articles and clauses, informs even the order in which the
former appears,26 and emerges powerfully in Article VII, structuring the
Constitution from tip to tail. As Amar explains, “[t]extually, Article VII even
echoes the exact wording of the Preamble, explaining how ‘this Constitution’
is to be establish[ed].”27
The above, though, does lead to a couple of critical questions. First, why is
this apparent pattern noteworthy? And second, prior to the Bill of Rights, how
exactly did popular sovereignty manifest itself throughout (most parts of) the
Constitution? Indeed, we see the existence of other themes, such as separation
of powers, checks and balances, rule of law, transparency, and various
Enlightenment values, but what connection might they have to each other and
to popular sovereignty? This is where a fractal analysis can perhaps be
informative, offering a unifying theory in constitutional thought.
The fractal theory essentially answers these questions simultaneously. To
see how, let us deconstruct and begin by addressing the second question. And
to do so, a discrete fractal analogy here will help. Let us take a Koch
snowflake, a fractal resembling an actual snowflake. The structure begins with

21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 239 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999) (emphasis
added).
22. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 5 (2005).
23. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 793 (1999).
24. Akhil Reed Amar, Architexture, 77 IND. L.J. 671, 675 (2002).
25. Id. at 681.
26. See AMAR, supra note 22, at 208 (noting that the Constitution has a pyramidal structure
that conveys a democratic logic, with “the People” as the pyramid’s foundation, then the
legislature, then the executive, and then the judiciary).
27. Amar, supra note 24, at 684.
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an “initiator”—here, an equilateral triangle.28 Erase the middle third of each
side of the triangle, and then fill each gap with a “tent” shape (here, another
equilateral triangle, but minus one full side). At first, this algorithm will
produce a Star of David, but when applied recursively, will generate a
snowflake shape. In a sense, the Constitution is structured like a Koch
snowflake fractal. If we think of the individual person as the “initiator”, and
“We the People”, or, popular sovereignty as the “tents”, we can go through
similar iterations of the latter to arrive at the Constitution. Now, the various
grand Constitutional themes, at first glance, might not look too similar to our
original “tents.” Indeed, these themes appear to be different from (albeit deeply
complimentary to) popular sovereignty. But, it is argued here, that just as the
various branches of the Koch snowflake are repetitions of that original tent
shape, the Constitution’s grand themes are in actuality permutations of popular
sovereignty.
Popular sovereignty is, in one deep sense, a particular conception of
power. It suggests that, just as an individual ought to have control over her
own fate and enjoy a deep respect of her personhood and autonomy, so too
should “the People” have rule over themselves (and indeed, each seems
impracticable without the other). To realize such popular self-governing and
self-government, there must exist a particular distribution of political power. A
deep respect for the equal endowment of the unalienable rights of all human
beings (ideally) is what logically generates these power relations. I say
“logically” because “equal” necessarily means that one person or group cannot
enjoy unalienable rights over and above those of their peers, for any such
disparity would by definition undermine such a distribution of political power.
Logically, then, popular sovereignty in the U.S. leaves no room for
monarchies, oligarchies, aristocracies, or any other such type of rule whereby
political power is similarly concentrated in the hands of the few. Indeed,
Madison, who recognized that “power is of an encroaching nature,”29 spoke to
this in The Federalist No. 39, stating that a republic is “a government which
derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the
people.”30
The Constitution’s grand themes, it seems, are essentially analogues of
popular sovereignty. Just as popular sovereignty calls for an equal distribution
of political power amongst the populace (insofar as each individual is endowed
with equal inherent rights which, ideally, instills in them power over their own
personhood and entitles them to equal respect thereof), the separation of
powers for instance, evinces that distribution. As Madison/Publius explained in
The Federalist No. 47, “[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative,
28. MANDELBROT, supra note 5, at 42.
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 305 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 21, at 237 (emphasis added).
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executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many,
and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny.”31 Hence, such a separation of powers is
designed precisely to keep power out of the hands of the few, retain power in
“the People”, and embody the principle of popular sovereignty.
Indeed, the same can be said for checks and balances. Madison/Publius
argued in The Federalist No. 51 that the logic of a system of checks and
balances fundamentally mirrored that of popular sovereignty:
This policy of supplying . . . better motives, might be traced through the whole
system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly
displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim
is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may
be a check on the other — that the private interest of every individual may be a
sentinel over the public rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less
32
requisite in the distribution of the supreme powers of the State.

Checks and balances, then, is also a fractal-like iteration of popular sovereignty
since, in a critical sense, it is a deep expression of popular self-government.
And ultimately, the Constitution’s general commitment to (various)
Enlightenment values also represents yet another iteration of popular
sovereignty. For instance, the rejection of the idea and practice of conferring
titles of nobility represents a certain restatement of popular sovereignty, as it
forbids an upset of the latter’s basic and fundamental diffuse distribution of
political power. In The Federalist No. 39, Madison/Publius clearly indicated
that any titles of nobility would be contrary to the very “complexion” of the
republican system, which enables “that honorable determination which
animates every votary of freedom to rest all our political experiments on the
capacity of mankind for self-government.”33 Indeed, the very concept of
nobility would elevate one class of individuals above another, and thereby
undermine any notion of popular sovereignty by invariably altering the sort of
equal power relations for which it calls.
Certainly, the list of examples of grand Constitutional themes continues,
and the above logic would generally apply to those as well. The next relevant
question then, is why this pattern of popular sovereignty and its iterations
matter. Essentially, there are two main reasons here: constitutional coherence
and constitutional interpretation.
a. Coherence
The American composer, Charles Wuorinen, observed fractals in music,
noting that “the same harmonic progression may determine the course of a
31. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 298 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
32. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
33. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 21, at 236.
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whole movement.”34 Although a fractal pattern does not itself constitute
“composing”, it is still deeply important because it represents the preparation
for it. Wuorinen explained that, “[h]aving made such preparation, then, I have
found it possible to compose with a kind of intuitive freedom which still
assures macrostructural coherence. Those who try for this coherence without
structural underpinnings usually fail.”35 Similarly, popular sovereignty and its
fractal-like iterations in the U.S. Constitution are critical because, it is argued
here, they form the structural underpinnings of the Constitution and provide for
the document’s macrostructural coherence. Such coherence is key because it
makes the Constitution intelligible as a unified body of profound values, rather
than a mere checklist of discrete clauses. This coherence provides for a certain
legal richness and texture capable of embodying the nation’s deep democratic
logic, that a mere set of rules could not.
In a sense, then, such coherence speaks to the very constitution of the
Constitution. The latter is not simply a set of concepts that are “merely
juxtaposed and contingently aggregated under a single rubric.”36 Rather, the
fractal-like structural underpinning of the Constitution represents a kind of
implicit ordering principle—a sort of underlying reason, somewhat comparable
to Kant’s notion of reason. Kant believed that reason serves the important
function of ordering concepts for, if such concepts are “isolated from one
another, separated, as it were, by an empty intervening space,”37 then that
rubric would merely be a compilation of its various components. The U.S.
Constitution, however, is very much more than the sum of its parts. As
Laurence Tribe has argued, the Constitution is not merely a set of written
commands and instructions.38 Rather, in The Invisible Constitution, he posits
that there is an entire “dark matter” that animates and undergirds much of the
visible text.39 As such, the Constitution seems to have a kind of conceptual
fabric, an underlying logic and pattern that holds it together and informs its
various parts.
And, under the fractal theory of American constitutionalism, such
coherence further indicates that, just as the whole shape promotes the various
parts, the various parts inform the whole structure. We see this crosspollination, for instance, in the Article III treason clause which, as Akhil Amar
pointed out, both contains the Constitution’s grand themes, and also informs
34. Frame & Mandelbrot, supra note 1, at Music: Wuorinen.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. This phrase is borrowed from Ernest Weinrib, who used it in the context of his treatise
on private law, but it is apropos here. See ERNEST JOSEPH WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW
88 (1995).
37. IMMANUEL KANT, IMMANUEL KANT’S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 543 (Norman Kemp
Smith trans., 1st ed. 1929).
38. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 9 (2008).
39. Id. at 38.
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the document as a whole as it seems to have constituted an entire proto-Bill of
Rights.40 Indeed, a deeper look at additional examples will follow. The
immediate point, however, is about how the Constitution coheres, and about
what such coherence tells us about the Constitution and how it operates. Here,
the Kant-like notion of reason, implicit in the Constitution’s fractal-like
structure, it seems, functions to arrange the document’s concepts in a way that
provides for each part of the Constitution to simultaneously condition, and be
conditioned by, each of the other parts as well as the whole. Like a fractal,
then, the Constitution is both remarkably complex and yet simple.
Such coherence, moreover, suggests a certain depth and profoundness to
the Constitution and the democratic logic and values that it embodies. Since
the Constitution’s grand themes manifest themselves on broad levels, across
articles, and in various individual clauses, which generally cohere, those grand
themes not only tend to be ubiquitous, but also multidimensional. In a fractallike fashion, these themes remain equally robust at every level and scale.
Indeed, that foundational principle of popular sovereignty—whether it be a
permutation of individual rights or a “generator” of the vast fractal-like
structure of the Constitution—signifies, thanks to such coherence, a powerful
coalescence of American statehood and individual personhood, which is most
fitting for a document that was ratified by and for the People.
b. Constitutional interpretation.
Yale historian John Gaddis has used fractals to describe how seemingly
inconsequential occurrences could spawn historical events.41 By looking at
how particular incidents could shape larger phenomena, he was able to deduce
a certain process from the structure of events.42 Indeed, a somewhat similar
logic is not entirely foreign to the law. Charles Black, for example, posited
that, in interpreting the Constitution, certain inferences can reasonably be, and
ought to be, drawn from the structures and relationships created by the
Constitution,43 suggesting that there exists “a close and perpetual interworking
between the textual and the relational and structural modes of reasoning.”44
Such an interaction between the Constitution’s structure and text is of
particular interest here, because the fractal-like structure of the U.S.
Constitution indeed provides a certain logic for a type of textual interpretation
of the document.

40. AMAR, supra note 22, at 244.
41. JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE LANDSCAPE OF HISTORY: HOW HISTORIANS MAP THE PAST
25, 83 (2002).
42. See id. at 35.
43. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8
(1969).
44. Id. at 31.
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The Constitution’s macrostructural coherence, in a way, calls for
interpretive coherence. Therefore, just as there is a legal principle that like
cases ought to generally be treated alike, various words and phrases that
reappear multiple times in the Constitution generally ought to be interpreted in
a similar fashion. The fractal theory posits that the Constitution is a unified
body of profound values, and as such, ought to be read in a holistic way. The
grand, animating principle of popular sovereignty and its various iterations run
deeply throughout (most) of the Constitution,45 and therefore, reading any
ambiguous words, phrases, or clauses in a disjunctive fashion would be to
ignore the document’s deeper thematic relations. Indeed, such a disjointed
interpretation could threaten to reduce the written Constitution to a mere set of
rules, rendering its written commands inconsistent with (to borrow a phrase)
the “invisible Constitution.”46 The latter’s fractal-like pattern signals a certain
profoundness and consistency, and the words and phrases on the parchment
are, insofar as it is linguistically possible, supposed to make visible (or at least
evident) the document’s deep underlying principles. Reading the text as a set
of disconnected clauses would not merely incline one to understand the
Constitution’s terms inconsistently, but it would generally function to sever
word from Constitutional principle.
Therefore, given the self-similar properties inherent in the Constitution’s
structure, the document’s wording ought to be, logically, read congruently with
the latter, in what Amar calls an “intratextual” fashion.47 This mode of
interpretation, as Amar explains, is methodologically distinct from standard
doctrinal, historical, prudential, structural, and even textual techniques.48
Unlike a standard textual interpretation, which Bobbitt explains “rest[s] on a
sort of ongoing social contract, whose terms are given their contemporary
meanings continually reaffirmed by the refusal of the People to amend the
instrument,”49 intratextualism necessarily examines at least two clauses in the
Constitution in order to underscore the connection between them and
understand how they might cohere. To be sure, the fractal theory does not
exclude other modes of constitutional interpretation (provided that those
methods understand the Constitution in a coherent manner). But it does
specifically make sense that, where a word or phrase is repeated, and the

45. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 22, at 35 (noting that Articles V and VI of the Constitution
“extinguished the right and power of unilateral secession for each state populace that joined
the . . . union, thereby merging itself into the continental sovereignty of the American people.”).
46. TRIBE, supra note 38, at 77.
47. Amar, supra note 23, at 788–91.
48. See id. (explaining that unlike the traditional texualist approach, which looks to words in
isolation, intratextualism “always focuses on at least two clauses and highlights the link between
them.”); see also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7–8
(1984) (providing a brief summary of the various modes of constitutional interpretation).
49. BOBBITT, supra note 48, at 26.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

CONSTITUTIONAL FRACTICALITY

401

principles underlying them are part of a structure that makes the latter selfsimilar, then the words or phrases in question should analogously be treated as
self-similar, fractal-like images of each other, too.
This apparent pattern in the Constitution, then, seems noteworthy with
major implications for Constitutional interpretation. Nonetheless, before
proceeding to the next section, it should be worthwhile here to address a
possible criticism of the fractal theory and its implications for constitutional
interpretation. All this self-similarity, particularly with respect to the specific
mode of constitutional interpretation that the fractal theory logically calls for,
conceivably might be criticized as promoting a redundant understanding of the
Constitution. Certainly, insofar as constitutional rules of construction are
concerned, it is commonly asserted that the document should be read in a way
so as to avoid redundancy.50 While redundancy is sometimes desirable in life
(for example, in airplane safety mechanisms), the argument here suggests that,
with respect to the Constitution, we are to presume that the Framers were
sound and skillful drafters, and that we are therefore to ask what is the value
added by each clause.51 The intratextualist method that the fractal theory
logically suggests as an approach, then, might appear to contravene this rule of
construction since the self-similarity not only of concepts, but of clauses,
signals a certain repetitiousness that arguably adds no value.
Such a criticism of redundancy is misguided. It is useful here to adopt a
metaphor used by Laurence Tribe. In his piece, “The Curvature of
Constitutional Space,” Tribe draws on Einstein’s general relativity theory,
explaining that Einstein posited that space itself is bent, and that the “curved
space” metaphor was pertinent to the law.52 The metaphor is certainly most
useful, but its application here is slightly different. In the present context, it is
material to focus on the material of space. That is, Einstein realized that
space—that vast void which had previously been thought to be nothingness—
was actually something. That so called emptiness has curvature and may
indeed be a kind of fabric of our universe. Similarly, the alleged absence of
value added by redundancy misconstrues repetition as devoid of meaning. In
actuality, as Amar explains, such redundancy is illuminative and bolsters
clarity, making that which had been implicit more explicit.53 In so doing,

50. Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1998).
51. Id. at 12.
52. Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn
from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (1989) (“A parallel conception in the legal
universe would hold that, just as space cannot extricate itself from the unfolding story of physical
reality, so also the law cannot extract itself from social structures.”).
53. See Amar, supra note 50, at 2, 20.
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intratextualism (if performed non-mechanically and sensibly54) thus operates to
explicate the text and highlight the conceptual fabric of the Constitution.
Now that we have seen what such fractal analysis reveals about the nature
of the Constitution and why this is significant, let us return to some additional,
noteworthy examples of constitutional fracticality.
IV. ARTICLE I, SECTION 10: ATTAINDER, EX POST FACTO, AND NOBILITY
Article I, section 10 of the Constitution provides fertile ground for an
examination of constitutional fracticality. This section’s prohibition on bills of
attainder, ex post facto laws, and conferrals of titles of nobility represents a
powerful iteration of the Constitution’s grand themes, and further functions as
a generator for recurrences of these very same themes elsewhere.55 Indeed,
popular sovereignty seems to animate these prohibitions. “We the People”
signals a government by and for the people, and as such, no one may be above
the law. A bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or a title of nobility, would each
contravene this principle. A bill of attainder would essentially create a class of
one—namely, the individual targeted by the legislation. While that one person
would be subject to the law in question, all others, by corollary, would be
above it. As such, it would create a society in which there would be a de facto
class of “power-crats”—a class of privileged legislators who would enjoy the
authority to wield governmental law-making powers against specific
individuals. As such, this would contravene popular sovereignty because this
would in effect be a censorial power in the Government over the people, for no
one would be safe from such punitive legislation.
Ex post facto laws would offend popular sovereignty in a similar way, for
as Amar explains, such retroactive statutes could equally be used to target a
specific victim by “reverse engineer[ing] an attainder,” substituting the exact
description of the victim’s past, innocent conduct for his name.56 Titles of
nobility, likewise, would transgress popular self-government, for any
hereditary Congressional posts would not signify representation of,
accountability to, and sovereignty in the people, but rather authority on the
basis of bloodline. It is for this reason that Hamilton/Publius remarked in The
Federalist No. 84,

54. See Amar, supra note 23, at 799–800 (noting that intratextualism, when carried to
extremes, can lead to misinterpretations if overly “mystical,” too “mechanical,” or exclusive of all
other tools of interpretation).
55. See AMAR, supra note 22, at 124 (“With this short list of don’ts protecting individual
liberty and republican equality against Congress and the states, the Constitution offered, in
miniature, a stylistic and conceptual template for the later Bill of Rights and Reconstruction
Amendments.”).
56. Id. at 125.
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[n]othing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of
nobility. This may truly be denominated the cornerstone of republican
government; for so long as they are excluded there can never be serious danger
57
that the government will be any other than that of the people.

Certainly then, the Framers designed a document that was in sharp contrast
with English practices, where bills of attainder were permitted, titles of nobility
were conferred, and sovereignty resided in the Parliament rather than the
people.58
Article I, section 10 exhibits fracticality, moreover, not only because this
particular section is shaped by the overarching theme of popular sovereignty,
but because in its mere fifty-seven words, it essentially captures all of the
complex contours of this principle that animates the entire Constitution. The
Attainder Clause, as Amar suggests, promotes separation of powers by
dichotomizing penal adjudication from penal lawmaking since it makes it the
exclusive domain of the judiciary to apply laws against named individuals,59
and also affirms checks and balances by “preventing any single branch of
government from unilaterally depriving persons of life, liberty, or property.”60
The section’s prohibition against ex post facto laws encourages open and
transparent government, both by preventing the sort of legislative duplicity
described above, and by enabling individuals to know what is the law prior to,
rather than subsequent to, acting.61 And, the forbiddance on conferrals of titles
of nobility reflects the Enlightenment value that individuals ought to be
recognized for their deeds rather than their descent.62
Indeed, this pattern of self-similarity is not only evident within Article I,
section 10, but this section also in turn informs other areas of the Constitution,
generating even deeper self-similarity. In a variety of ways, this section, to
borrow a phrase, functioned as a “proto-Bill of Rights.”63 The ban on bills of
attainder and ex post facto laws prevented the threat of punitive legislation that
could inhibit free speech; the attainder clause, as Amar explains, “implicates
rights of individualized adjudicatory process—due process rights of notice and
the opportunity to be heard”;64 and the prohibitions of attainder and ex post
facto laws arguably adumbrates protections against cruel and unusual
punishments—all thereby foreshadowing the First, Fifth and Eighth

57. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 511 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999)
(emphasis added).
58. AMAR, supra note 22, at 103, 124–25.
59. Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV.
203, 210 (1996).
60. Id. at 211 n.23.
61. Id. at 210.
62. AMAR, supra note 22, at 243.
63. Id. at 244.
64. Amar, supra note 59, at 211 n.23.
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amendments, respectively.65 Additionally, Article I, section 10 operated as
proto-Reconstruction Amendments: the bar against attainders portended the
principle underlying the prohibition against slavery by illuminating the evils of
persecuting individuals for who they were rather than what they did.66
Attainders are, as Amar suggested, “all about equality”67 and, thus, forecasted
the idea of equal protection; and, the ban on granting titles of nobility (and thus
hereditary Congressional posts) would help ensure that the right to vote goes
unabridged. Consequently, there seems to be evidence of deep self-similarity
on a variety of levels and scales.
V. REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT CLAUSE
Fracticality abounds in the U.S. Constitution, and it is evident in the
Article IV, section 4 Republican Form of Government Clause.68 The
Reconstruction Era senator, Charles Sumner called it a “sleeping giant in the
Constitution,”69 and certainly, it embodies yet another repetition of the
Constitution’s monumental theme, popular sovereignty. Laurence Tribe
alluded to this repetition when he noted that “it would be very hard to say that
this clause embodies some unique vision of popular sovereignty,”70 and Akhil
Amar has stated that “the big idea [of the Republican Government Clause] was
to shore up popular sovereignty.”71 Madison, who explained in The Federalist
No. 43 the significance of such a provision, likewise recognized a pattern, for
he indicated that the provision would be at the very least a “harmless
superfluity”72—or in this context, a necessary redundancy, a crucial element of
self-similarity, promoting Constitutional coherence.
Equally, the Clause encapsulates the complexities of this central
underlying principle of the Constitution, thereby not only cementing the
philosophical integrity of the document, but bolstering the cohesion of the
nation. Indeed, the Republican Government Clause captures the wholeness of
popular sovereignty, advancing critical tenets of indivisibility of the nation,
checks and balances, and the ban on conferring titles of nobility. As Amar
elucidated, a tyranny in any state would constitute “a geostrategic threat to
each and every neighboring state.”73 The materialization of such tyrannies, and
even the threat of such dangers, could thwart the People’s pledge to “form a
65. Id.
66. Id. at 219.
67. Id.
68. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government”).
69. CONG. GLOBE, 40TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 614 (1867) (statement of Sen. Sumner).
70. TRIBE, supra note 38, at 90.
71. AMAR, supra note 22, at 279.
72. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 271 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
73. AMAR, supra note 22, at 280.
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more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for
the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and Our Posterity”.74 For, as Madison/Publius wrote in
The Federalist No. 43, “[t]he more intimate the nature of such a union may be,
the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each
other.”75 As such, Article IV, section 4 advanced the key notion of
indivisibility of the nation.
The Republican Government Clause, moreover, expounded the concept of
checks and balances. By guaranteeing to every state a republican form of
government, Article IV, section 4 created an environment in which each state
would effectively check and balance each other.76 The Clause preempted the
conceivable objection that a state might be construed as somehow “nosy” or
meddlesome if it were to keep watch over its neighbor’s affairs. As Madison
explained, states in a more perfect union acquire “the greater right to insist that
the forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be
substantially maintained,” and what better location for that right than in the
Constitution.77 Moreover, the concept of checks and balances embedded here,
operates on additional levels. According to Tribe, for example, it takes little
imagination to interpret this Clause as a prohibition against “the open-ended
delegation of direct governmental authority over others’ lives to private
individuals neither elected by the people nor appointed by anyone so
elected.”78 As such, Article IV, section 4 helps to ensure a certain political
accountability, in which the people have power over politicians, and, thus, act
as a check on the latter.
And, by forbidding such a delegation of unfettered governmental power,
the Republican Government Clause effectively functions as a ban on nobility.
Indeed, such a disallowance in the U.S. of aristocracy, monarchy, or any such
type of unaccountable governmental post, is the logical corollary of
maintaining sovereignty in the people. Put differently, if Article IV, section 4
is all about popular sovereignty—and indeed it is—then it necessarily leaves
no room for titles of nobility, and as such, operates as a prohibition against it.
Furthermore, the Republican Government Clause not only has properties
of constitutional self-similarity, but it simultaneously produces further
iterations. In certain respects, the Clause resembles a proto-Fourteenth
Amendment. Article IV, section 4’s protocol that each state be guaranteed a
republican form of government tenably provided a logical blueprint for the

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

U.S. CONST. pmbl.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 72, at 271.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 72, at 271.
TRIBE, supra note 38, at 89–90.
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“incorporation” doctrine.79 The underlying importance of consistency and
coherence that helps drive the Republican Government Clause, similarly
informs the well-established judicial principle that the Fourteenth Amendment
applies, or “incorporates,” nearly all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights
against states.
Lastly, on another level, we see what in fractal geometry is called, a
cascade effect. A “cascade” in this context is a generating mechanism.80
According to Mandelbrot, “[w]hen each piece of a shape is geometrically
similar to the whole, both the shape and the cascade that generate it are called
self-similar.”81 Here then, states’ republican governments, and the U.S.
Constitution’s “generating mechanism” contained in Article IV, section 4,
appear to have that property of self-similarity. As such, we see another fractallike iteration, here not just within the U.S. Constitution itself, but between the
latter and state constitutions, thereby introducing profound elements of selfsimilarity on an even smaller scale, promoting a synergetic structure that
buttresses American democracy at every scale.
VI. FRACTOGRAPHY: CONSTITUTIONAL FAULT-LINES AND STRUCTURAL
WEAKNESSES
There remains a critical, looming question. This was foreshadowed, and
indeed, the reader might have noticed important qualifiers throughout, such as
the statement that popular sovereignty runs through “virtually” the entire
Constitution. The question, put in stark terms, is: “what about slavery”?
Slavery plagued lives and U.S. history. Does the fractal theory simply handle
such a major, tragic aspect of the American story with a few qualifiers, in order
to substantially align history with the theory’s tenets? No. The theory makes no
attempt to describe slavery in fractal terms. To be clear, slavery is
fundamentally anti-fractal. Yet, this is not a weakness of the fractal metaphor.
On the contrary, this is where the fractal theory of American constitutionalism
does some of its most important work. Let us recall that fractals have an
application in fractography, a field that studies the mechanics of fractures in
materials, models crack growth behavior, and practices failure analysis.
Similarly, the fractal theory of American constitutionalism, far from writing
off anti-fractal elements as anomalous, in fact highlights these deep flaws,
signals that they may represent fault lines or structural weaknesses in the
Constitution’s makeup, and provides at least some general prescriptions on
how to mend these fractures, cracks, and chasms.

79. AMAR, supra note 22, at 386.
80. MANDELBROT, supra note 5, at 34.
81. Id.
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A simple fractal-like and fractographic-style failure analysis reveals not
only the obvious, deep moral problems with slavery, but also illuminates how
slavery introduced to the Constitution a significant element of egregious
incoherence. The Three-Fifths Clause and the Fugitive Slave Clause each
fundamentally contravened popular sovereignty and its iterations.82 The first
and clearest level on which this occurred was that slavery ineluctably violated
the personhood of blacks. Whereas American statehood was inspired by a
certain idea of individual personhood, where a people should have power over
themselves just as an individual ought to be able to decide her own fate, the
very notion of slavery contradicted this principle. But alas, this argument
would have lacked sway in early America, as slaves were not considered part
of the constitutional compact.83 Yet, the fractal theory demonstrates how,
nevertheless, the Three-Fifths Clause and Fugitive Slave Clause both failed on
their own terms.
The fractal theory of American constitutionalism, as noted, holds that selfsimilarity is a key component for constitutional coherence. Popular
sovereignty, it is argued here, is the Constitution’s fundamental principle, and
as such, it and its iterations must permeate the Constitution. The Three-Fifths
Clause and Fugitive Slave Clause contravene popular sovereignty, even if
slaves were not considered part of the constitutional compact. First, let us
return to popular sovereignty as a particular conception of power. If power is
to fundamentally reside in the great body of the people, rather than be
concentrated in the hands of the few in an unjust manner, then slavery—and
the Three-Fifths Clause in particular—undermined such a distribution because
it concentrated political power in the slave holders insofar as they enjoyed
proportionately more voting power than their counterparts in free states. That
is, slave states could increase their number of seats in Congress by acquiring
more slaves, thereby inflating the political power of each of their citizens
relative to those in free states. This kind of disparity of voting power between
citizens in slave states and free states was, thus, itself a violation of popular
sovereignty. Indeed, the 650,000 slaves in 1793 gave the South an extra
thirteen seats in the House.84 This grave inconsistency even created further
“cracks” in the structure, for in a similar fashion, slavery inflated slave owners’
power in presidential elections via the electoral college. The slave state of
Virginia circa 1800, for instance, enjoyed twenty-five percent more electoral

82. Amar, supra note 59, at 216 (arguing that clauses like the Fugitive Slave Clause,
although inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution, were tolerated until “the Constitution
worked itself pure with amendments that abolished slavery and reconfirmed the truest meaning of
the freedom principles embodied in the Attainder, Due Process, Republican Government and
other Clauses.”).
83. Id.
84. AMAR, supra note 22, at 94.
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votes than the free state of Pennsylvania, even though the latter had ten percent
more free persons than the former.85
Likewise, this accumulation of disproportionate political power in the
hands of slave owners created a condition similar, in principle, to aristocracy.
Slave owners unjustly bolstered their political power, undermining the credo of
one person, one vote. Fittingly, Akhil Amar has used the term, “slavocrats,”86
and it is thus clear how, in this way, slavery offended the Constitution’s ban on
nobility. It is perhaps less than surprising that such inconsistencies, such
incoherence, caused deep tensions and tectonic friction. Certainly, in this way
too, slavery undercut the Constitution’s theme of indivisibility of the nation.
Slavery’s profound lack of self-similarity to popular sovereignty and its
iterations created a constitutional fault line, ultimately turning the nation on
itself in the Civil War.
To borrow a phrase, “[a]lthough America has not always been smart, at
least she has been lucky — so far.”87 Here, fortunately, freedom prevailed and
the Reconstruction Amendments, reflecting inter alia Republican Government,
rule of law, and of course, popular sovereignty reconstructed the very structure
of the Constitution in key respects, bolstering coherence where the deep
inconsistencies created by the Three-Fifths Clause and Fugitive Slave Clause
had severely compromised macrostructural integrity. Hence, an important
lesson emerges here. The fractal theory not only demonstrates that the
Constitution has deep elements of self-similarity, but that it ought to have the
property of self-similarity since the latter is an essential ingredient in
Constitutional coherence. Therefore, an absence of self-similarity could signal
structural fault lines as in the examples just discussed, or even structural
weaknesses that should be addressed.
The electoral college, to this day, represents such a structural weakness.
Apart from what policy arguments exist either for or against the electoral
college, the fractal theory shows that it is incoherent in the constitutional
paradigm. As alluded to above, the original concept of the electoral college is
epistemologically connected to the Three-Fifths Clause, in that it enabled the
Southern states to count (three fifths of) their slaves toward their allotment of
electoral college votes.88 Even though slavery has been abolished, and even
though no less than ten post-1791 constitutional amendments have either
directly or indirectly reformed the electoral college,89 the latter continues to
undercut the precept of one person, one vote. While the electoral college might
not, today, signify a fault line, it does, it is argued here, represent a structural

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Amar, supra note 24, at 688.
See AMAR, supra note 22, at 262.
Id. at 173.
Amar, supra note 24, at 688.
Id. at 691.
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weakness for the notion of unequal voting power runs contrary to the principle
of popular sovereignty. The reason is that, if some individuals have more
weighty votes than others then in principle it means that, all other things being
equal, those persons have proportionately more political power than the
individuals with less weighty votes, thus, in essence, giving the former at least
a modicum of political rule over the latter.
While the electoral college might not be creating a fault line in the way
that slavery did, the former nevertheless produces structural weaknesses, which
can contribute to instability, as evidenced by the numerous occasions on which
a presidential candidate was denied residency in the White House despite
securing a plurality of the popular vote.90 While the fractal theory might not
offer specific details on how to solve this problem (indeed, it is not a panacea),
it does function to expose the dilemma. And by illuminating the nature of the
Constitution and constitutional coherence, fractal theory provides general
guidance on how to fix these flaws by pointing us not towards makeshift
solutions, but toward coherent amendments that naturally coalesce with the
deeply integrated structure of the Constitution.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although the present length of the U.S. Constitution is less than that of this
article, the former’s profound tenets have animated a way of life for hundreds
of millions of people over several generations. “We the People” are but three
simple words that, in a fractal-like fashion, have generated a philosophical
harmony that set the tone for the entire Constitution and the nation that it
binds. Indeed, the fractal theory helps us to hear all of the Constitution’s tonal
elements, understand its composition, appreciate how its clauses work in
concert, and identify which of its notes, despite its overall majesty, are off key.
Indeed, the fractal theory of American constitutionalism has illuminated
telling patterns of self-similarity, cohesiveness, and profoundness in the
Preamble and Article VII, the Treason Clause, the Attainder Clause, the
prohibition against ex post facto laws, the ban on granting titles of nobility, the
Republican Government Clause, the Bill of Rights, and in state constitutions.
To be sure, this is far from a comprehensive list of examples, for one need not
strain to find fracticality elsewhere, as in the Article I, section 6 free speech
clause, the Vesting Clauses, or the compensation of Senators and
Representatives, for instance. Recognizing such patterns opens up seminal
opportunities for vital insights into the nature of the Constitution, its structure,
contents, and operation, as well as provides guidance on logical methods of
interpreting the document. And conversely, the fractal theory provides

90. See Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College, 23 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1145, 1145 (2002).
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assistance in diagnosing dilemmas in the Constitution, as well as general
guidance on how to address them. It is in this way that the fractal approach
aids the voice of the American people, for it bolsters an understanding of the
democratic symphony, thereby better enabling all to participate in, contribute
to, and sustain the harmony in a meaningful way.

